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In the Egypt of 2008, half the population has known only one president, Husni Mubarak. And the rate of 
population growth, at its peak when Mubarak assumed office in 1981, has stopped declining as it had been 
in the 1990s. A new kind of population increase has begun. Such are the lessons of the provisional results 
of the Egyptian general population and housing census, conducted in November 2006 in accordance with 
the regular ten-year cycle. These demographic surprises have important implications for the stability of 
Egypt and the regimes economic liberalization and structural adjustment program. 
One might question, for example, the assumption that simply enrolling more girls in school will 
necessarily push fertility rates down for good. Combined with Islamic traditionalists' campaigns against 
women working, economic restructuring has greatly reduced women's job opportunities in the public 
sector and led to state disinvestment in women's schooling, contributing to impoverishment, degradation 
and population increase. 
The stubborn growth also underlines the urgency of three continuing crises: the persistent lack of 
affordable housing, the ongoing enlargement of the work force and the mass reliance upon low-paying, 
benefits-free jobs in the informal sector, and the unsustainable geographic concentration of the population 
in a very small part of Egyptian territory Under Mubarak, the government has spent billions to build desert 
mega-settlement around Cairo, on the seacoasts and in the invented "Second Nile Valley" plowed through 
the Sahara. But these projects house very few people, while the booming working-class population takes 
shelter in self-constructed settlements in the same areas of Egypt that have been most densely populated 
throughout history. Rather than migrating into the cities close to their jobs, Egyptians arc resorting to daily 
commuting from villages, which are becoming conurbations without urban qualities, or "ruralopolises"1. 
These gender and geographic contradictions of Egypt’s neoliberal political economy suggest that issues of 
population in Egypt are best seen through a pragmatic lens, and not through the polemics of Islamist 
moralism or state security hysteria. 
 
A Boomlet after the Boom 
In keeping with demographic trends evident since the 1980s, the last decade was marked by a slight drop 
in the rate of population growth, roughly matching the level measured at the last census. The most 
immediate consequence of this rate of growth is that between 1996 and 2000, the population of Egypt 
grew by 13.3 million people. This number is equal to the total number of Egyptians in 1917. During the 
preceding census period (1986-1996), the population grew by II million people, compared with 11.6 
million people between 1976 and 19x6. 7he negative growth rate during this period, viewed in Terms of 
absolute numbers, was unique in the demographic history of modern Egypt. In the last ten years, by 
contrast, we have witnessed considerable population growth (more than 2.3 million more people in Terms 
of absolute numbers), indicating that the downturn in population growth has slowed.  
With a total of 72.6 million inhabitants, Egypt now surpasses Iran's 70 million peoples; despite having 20 
times less habitable land (Egypt has 35,000 square kilometers as compared to 730,000 in Iran). If this 
trend continues, in ten years, the Egyptian population will have topped that of Turkey (currently are 74 
million). 
The average growth rate of the population between 1996 and 2006 was 2.05%, as compared with 2.08% 
for the previous decade and 2.8% for the period between 1976 and 1986.  The decrease in growth rate is 
thus a good deal less during the most recent decade than the preceding one.  Moreover, since the 
preliminary results identify 3.9 million Egyptians living abroad, compared with 2.18 million in 1996 and 
2.25 million in 1986 (1.4 million in 1976), the demographic growth from 1996-2006 was even stronger 
since the number of Egyptians living abroad remained stable during the preceding census period (1986-
1996) and it grew by 1.72 million during the last ten years.  Even if we attribute a part of this increase to 
the natural growth of the Egyptian population living abroad (on the order of 480,000 people in ten years, 
for a growth rate of 2 percent per year), we still see an increase of the Egyptian population during the last 
decade by 1.3 million people. Thus, the total population can be said to have grown by 14.6 million 
inhabitants in ten years. If we take into account chose 1.3 million Egyptians newly living abroad, not only 
does the growth rate not diminish between 1986-1996 and 1996-2006, but it can also be said to have 
increased by 2.2 percent per year. 
One factor mitigating against the general tendency toward negative population growth has been an 
increase in life expectancy from an average of 55 years in 1975 to 70.6 in 2004. But the primary factor is 
the entry into reproductive years of the female population born during the 1970s and at the beginning of 
the 1980s, when the birth rate had not yet begun to fall. The population boomlet is not simply a natural 
consequence of an increase in the number of Egyptians capable of bearing children. These women came of 
age at precisely the time when the Mubarak regime's downsizing of the public sector had blocked the main 
avenue their mothers and older sisters took to stable employment. Pushed back into marginal livelihoods, 
these women have likely borne more children so that there are more family members to sustain the 
household. 
 
Under Pressure 
The changing age distribution of the Egyptian population is quite clear in the data from 1986-1996 (see 
table 1). The significant reduction in mortality has also resulted in noticeable growth in the group of those 
aged 45 and above: Their numbers had increased by 4.8 million by the end of the period. 
From 2000 to 2006 (the period when children from 0-6 were born) we observe an increase in the birth 
rate, due to the very large increase in the cohort of women who are between 15 and 45 years old (3.3 
million more in 1006 than in 1996). The cohort of children between 0 and 6 years old grew by nearly 1.3 
million children during this rime compared to 1986-1996 when it diminished by 360,000. 
 
 
Table 1: Changing distribution of the population according to age group, 1996-2006 
 
1996 2006 
Distribution% Distribution% Annual  % change
Absolute change 
 1996 2006  
0-6 8,937,224 10,224,256 15.1 14.1 1.35 1,287,032 
6-10 5,508,051 5,043,247 9.3 6.9 -0.88 -464,804 
10-15 7,864,002 7,796,386 13.3 10.7 -0.09 -67,616 
15-45 27,360,320 34,983,045 46.2 48.2 2.49 7,622,725 
45-60 6,194,978 9,978,402 10.5 13.7 4.88 3,783,424 
> 60 years 3,412,097 4,553,694 5.8 6.3 2.93 1,141,597 
TOTAL 59,276,672 72,579,030 100.0 100.0 2.05 13,302,358 
 
One positive element of this picture is that the number of school-age young people (between 6 and 15 
years old) has remained stable for the first in the history of Egypt. Hence, there is a favorable climate for 
the improvement of education, from rates of retention to the modernization of equipment. That said, the 
last ten years of structural adjustment have also been marked by stagnant education budgets. With the 
significant increase in the number of adults in the country, moreover, the pressures on the job and housing 
markets are intense. 
The working-age population, those between 16 and 60 years old, grew by 1.3 million people. The 
potential demand for jobs from this group alone was thus equal to the total population of Cairo in 1996 or 
half of the working-age population in 1976. Egypt faces an impossible equation: Under-employment and 
poverty must rise, since the public sector has been shrunk and the selloff of state factories has not 
succeeded at creating the requisite replacement jobs in the private sector. A recent study shows that 
concurrent with the decline of employment opportunities in the public sector, the trend toward 
informalization of the labor market, begin in the 1990’s is continuing unabated. By 2006, 6 percent of all 
employment was informal, up from 57 percent in 1998. Moreover, 75 percent of new entrants into the 
labor market in the first five years of this decade were entering into informal work."' Only the service 
sector has been able to absorb the workers displaced by the destruction of public-sector jobs. The 
unemployment rate has actually decreased, from 11.7 per cent in 1998 to 8.3 percent in 2006, but at the 
cost of the quality of employment. Most households today cope with job insecurity low-wage work and 
inflation. Domestic consumption is lifeless. 
Along similar lines, there are 17.3 million households in 2006, 4.5 million more than in 1996. In 1006, 
there were 29 million men (over 18 years of age) and women over 16 years of age) who were married, 8 
million more than ten years previously (compared with an increase of 3.8 million during the decade 1986-
1996). 
The pressure on the housing market has thus increased, even if the annual rate of marriage is trending 
toward decline. The state is moving away from building public housing; while real estate developers are 
moving toward high-end markets and speculation, and so popular demand is satisfied by an informal 
market that produces modest buildings of three or four stories even in the smallest of villages. The 
majority of the population, having no alternative, is currently living in such illegal, « haphazard » 
settlements (the literal translation of their Arabic moniker, ‘ashwa’iyyat)3. These popular encroachments 
became the norm in the 1990s, when public land was privatized and given over to real estate speculation 
and the construction of wealthy gated communities by few big contractors. State contestation of the 
‘ashwa’iyyat is very rare, and some are even being legalized in accordance with a liberal perspective on 
land titling and enlargement of the land and real estate market. The proliferation of illegal settlements 
could not be stopped without disrupting the course of economic liberalization; they became, for instance, a 
substantial market for the cement and steel tycoons who had also been big beneficiaries of privatization. 
The popular quarters of the largest cities and provincial towns are also flourishing markets as they totally 
lack public services. The masses are reliant upon private initiatives for schooling and access to health care: 
They have passed from dependency on the whims of the regime to dependency on the whims of the 
market. Otherwise, only the Islamist charitable societies are offering support to the population, at the same 
time giving a potential social stabilization net to the regime and posing a possible challenge to its claims 
of legitimacy. 
  
 
Table 2: number of households and number of units of lodging 
 1986 1996 2006 Variation 
1986-96 
Variation 
1996-06 
Rate of variation 
1986-96 
Rate of 
variation 
1996-06 
Households 9,718,663 12,722,974 17,265,567 3,004,311 4,542,593 3.1 2.7 
Units 11,282,967 18,841,471 27,786,857 7,555,504 8,945,386 5.3 4.0 
Difference 1,564,304 6,118,497 10,521,290 4,554,193 4,402,793   
 
Even as the housing crisis deepens, the licensed production of private housing units routinely surpasses 
demand (see table 2). The census counted 10.6 million more dwellings than households in 2006, compared 
with 1.1 in 1976. In other words, in Egypt more than 10.5 million housing units sit empty-the clearest 
proof of the inegalitarian manner in which the revenues generated by the infitah have been invested since 
the 1980s. 
As was also the case between 1986 and 1996, between1996 and zoo6 newly built housing exceeded the 
number of households by 4.4 million units. These results reveal the large demographic disequilibrium and 
uneven distribution of wealth that weigh upon the social, economic and political wellbeing of Egypt. 
In the face of these pressing social needs, the regime holds on to its power through authoritarian measures 
alone while popular outrage simmers. We need only to think of the problem of the increased need for food 
generated by an additional 13 million inhabitants, when half of the demand for wheat in the country is met 
by purchases on the international markets and bilateral aid. 
 
Concentration 
Besides structural adjustment and economic liberalization, the last decade was also marked by the pursuit 
of development megaprojects intended to redistribute population, notably the "Peace Canal" in northern 
Sinai and the perimeter of Toshka to the West of Lake Nasser. Added to this is the boom of investment in 
the tourist industry along the Red Sea, in the provinces of the Red Sea and South Sinai. With the 
announcement of the preliminary results from the 2006 census, the authorities were pleased to show high 
rates of demographic growth in these new areas, in which they have invested heavily. 
That said, the cumulative demographic growth of the desert provinces accounts for only 3.5 percent of the 
total growth in Egypt since 2006, To be sure, this is one percentage point higher than during the two 
preceding decades, but that translates into only 470,000 people out of 13.3 million. 
In short, since 1917, the proportion of the population from desert regions has grown from 0.3 percent to 
1.8 percent of the total population-a veritable drop in the bucket. What is more, the majority of occupants 
in the provinces of the Red Sea and South Sinai are men, indicating weak prospects for long-term 
development in these areas dedicated to international tourism (in the Red Sea capital, Hurghada, there are 
106,000 men and only 54,000 women). For the majority of the male migrant workers, the desert is only a 
temporary relocation either in the service of capital accumulation or for the benefit of families in the Nile 
Valley or the Delta. 
More than 98 percent of the population of Egypt lives in the Delta and the Nile Valley, as always. 
Moreover, the provinces where the government focused its land reclamation projects, such as Sharqiyya 
and Buhayra, are seeing reductions in their rates of population growth as compared to the previous decade. 
The provinces' large plots of irrigated land attract only a temporary influx of workers at harvest time. Only 
the region of Port Said can be said to have a noticeable acceleration in its rate of population growth, due to 
the improvement projects on the lakes to the West and east of the Suez Canal at the opening of the Peace 
Canal. Isma'iliyya has also still maintained a relatively elevated rate of growth. 
The densification of the Delta and the Nile Valley, therefore, remains the norm. The average density is 
currently 2,000 inhabitants per square kilometer, compared with 1,700 in 1796. Outside of urban 
governorates, the average density is 1,630 in the Delta and 1,830 in the Nile Valley. In ten years' time, an 
average of 300 more people will inhabit each square kilometer - an Asiatic geographic distribution rather 
than a Middle Eastern one. 
For the first time in 150 years, the provinces to the south of Greater Cairo are experiencing marked 
growth. In the middle of the nineteenth century, almost half of the population lived in Upper Egypt, but 
sine the 1960s less than 30 percent have lived there. Between 1976 and 2006, however, the percentage has 
gone from 28.4 percent to 28.7 percent, a sign of a more slowly declining birthrate (if not a stagnating 
one), a falling mortality rate and a slowdown in emigration. On the other hand, the percentage of the 
population in the Delta continued to decrease. Moving from 42.4 percent to 41.6 percent, while the Canal 
Zone returned to numbers it had not seen since the 1967 war, with 2.8 percent of the Egyptian population. 
The percentage of the Egyptian population living in Greater Cairo, which includes the governorates of 
Cairo, Giza and Qalyubiyya, has increased to 25.2 percent in 2006, after having decreased slightly 
between 1986 and 1996. This rise can be accounted for by growth in the area's formerly rural outer 
regions, since the area defined as urban in Greater Cairo remained stable with 18 percent of the Egyptian 
population. 
The rate of growth of Greater Cairo, at 2.09 percent, has become markedly stronger than in the rest of 
Egypt, at 1.9 percent. Satellite cities in the desert, once ghost towns, are quietly showing signs of life, 
having absorbed some 417,000 inhabitants between 1996 and 2006. By now provide accommodations to 
13.5 percent of Greater Cairo's population, as compared with 3.1 percent ten years ago, but these new 
towns account for only 10 percent of the total demographic growth of the three governorates. The densely 
packed informal outskirt house the vast majority. 
Interestingly, Cairo's share of the Greater Cairo population continues to diminish in comparison to Giza 
and Qalyubiyya. The Cairo governorate did experience a revival of population growth, moving from 1.2 
percent to 1.7 percent, due to the new development in the direction of the Eastern Desert. Nevertheless, its 
growth remains weak, a sign of continued absolute demographic decline of the ancient city center and 
increased migration toward Giza and Qalyubiyya. Central and old Cairo lost something like 297,000 
inhabitants over the last decade. 
Alexandria has also experienced a significant revival of population growth. Having dropped to 1.2 percent 
per year between 1786 and 1976, the rate rebounded to 2.1 percent during 1776-2006, which translates 
into more than 780,000 additional inhabitants, mostly though a massive enlargement and densification of 
the informal outskirts. 
It is noteworthy that official figures measuring urban population continue to drop, down to 42.6 percent 
from 44 percent in 1786. From the official perspective, Egypt has been becoming less and less urbanized 
for the last 20 years. 
The administrative definition of an urban region, which has remained fixed with die exception of several 
reclassifications in the region of Greater Cairo, has acquired the status of artifact. It does not account for 
the dynamic urbanization of areas that, like the villages of Greater Cairo, are outside of the traditional city 
limits. 
More detailed data is needed to determine the extent of this urbanization from below. In 1776, the rate of 
urbanization in Egypt (defined as the part of the population living in the 800 agglomerations greater than 
10,000 inhabitants) was calculated at 70 percent.5 Today, that figure is around 80 percent. Most of those 
neo-urbanites, no longer engaged in agriculture, have to earn their living and make their settlements 
habitable by themselves-without services from the state and, indeed, without its recognition. 
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